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The Eurozone crisis is severely limiting the EU’s foreign
policy capacity.
by Blog Admin
Spyros Economides argues that the eurocrisis has resulted in a more ‘introverted’ Europe.
Existential fears about the future of the EU have increased member states’ divisions over
foreign policy issues, and there is a perpetual ‘tug-of-war ’ between EU states with global and
regional ambitions. He writes that the EU has a very long way to go to build a European
foreign policy.
The Eurozone crisis has marginalised the attention devoted to the EU’s f oreign policy
capacity. As Member States argue over the merit of  f inancial stability and rescue
mechanisms to bail out debtor sovereigns, and debate the need f or f iscal integration and ref orm of  the
EMU, the EU’s global impact weakens. It does so f or two reasons.
The f irst is obvious: a vulnerable single currency weakens the competit iveness of  the single market; a less
competit ive single market weakens the f oreign policy of  a polity which is dependent – to a great extent – on
its commercial prowess to be able to inf luence. The second is less obvious but equally harmf ul to EU
interests: the severity of  the internal f inancial crisis, and its inescapable polit ical and social consequences,
has resulted in a heavy dose of  ‘Euro- introspection’. Europe is turning away f rom the world as it is
consumed with its internal arrangements and f uture prospects f or European integration.
Introvert Europe?
This introspection is the result of  a return of  the core question to the European project: how f ar do
sovereign member states want to push the f ederal agenda? Is f iscal union needed or even desired, and
how f ar does this push us down the line of  polit ical union? This perennial dichotomy between sovereign
state interests and the growing power of  a supranational Union has also always been at the core of  the EU
f oreign policy debate. Today is no dif f erent. Europe’s ability and need to conduct f oreign policy is being
severely restricted by an existential debate which reinf orces the existing reticence of  member states to
‘lose control’ of  the f oreign policy sphere. It has always been thus.
European Polit ical Co-operation (EPC) was launched in the 1970s as an intergovernmental process outside
the conf ines of  the treaties. Member States were moved to begin a dialogue on the role of  the EC in the
world, and an exchange of  inf ormation and views about their views and interests on f oreign policy matters,
just as the EC was emerging as a growing presence on the international stage f ollowing its increasing
just as the EC was emerging as a growing presence on the international stage f ollowing its increasing
commercial stature.
But progress was slow and integration limited: it was clear that f oreign policy remained within the ambit of
the state. While co-operative policy making processes were proposed, f oreign policy meetings became
regularised, and certain common posit ions on external matters were achieved, f oreign policy still seemed to
be beyond the reach of  the ‘European project’ as states wished to keep control over a policy area deemed
vital to ‘the national interest’. The great transf ormation which occurred at Maastricht was that EPC was
supplanted by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as f oreign policy was brought within the
Treaty system and many of  its workings were institutionalised within the Union.
Nonetheless, the basic tension between state and Union in f oreign policy persisted, and the EU had to be
built around the pillar structure, allowing member states to retain a veto right in a system which operated
(and still does) on the principle of  unanimity. The Lisbon Treaty modif ied this approach, ref ormed the pillar
structure drawing Commission and Council closer together and creating the External Action Service (EEAS),
beef ed up the def ence and security dimension of  the Union, linking it more closely with the narrower
f oreign policy dimension, and pursued changes in the mechanics of  decision-making, building on previous
treaty ref orms at Amsterdam and elsewhere.
This brief  historical digression is merely there to reinf orce the view that state sovereignty is still a core
issue in the EU as it is evolving today. It has always been so in terms of  f oreign policy, and the current
‘introvert EU’ only emphasises the centrality of  this principle to the European project in both its internal and
international dimensions.
State sovereignty isn’t  the only obstacle
The relationship between national and EU f oreign policy systems has been a core issue in almost every
Treaty since Maastricht as it highlights the sovereignty issue and its centrality to European integration in
general. Some would argue that the EU is limited as an international actor exactly because states are
reticent to hand over sovereign rights to a central f oreign policy decision-making authority – thus limiting
the scope and power of  the EU to act. The need to seek consensus is not only t ime-consuming but also a
hostage to f ortune, increasingly so as the EU enlarges and multiple actors and interests are introduced.
But there may be at least two other usef ul ways of  explaining the limitations of  EU f oreign policy and the
relationship between national and European levels of  f oreign policy making, beyond the state sovereignty
model. The f irst is to suggest that one of  the core limitations to the development of  a coherent, consistent
and potent European f oreign policy is that it is not always clear that there exists a consensus on the need
f or a an expansive issue-based or geographic f oreign policy. Essentially what is at stake here is a perpetual
tug-of -war between those who envisage the EU as having a global reach and hence global ambitions, and
those whose interests are geopolit ically limited and take a more parochial view in European f oreign policy
terms.
In the f irst camp we may place both states with a ‘global past’ (the UK, France) and those who see a point
in pursuing a ‘values’ based f oreign policy which is universally applicable. In the second camp, we may f ind
an array of  ‘smaller states’ (Greece, Lithuania) whose interests are regionally limited and, more importantly,
a ‘big power’ such as Germany which has struggled in historical terms to def ine its global interests and
which has f ocused more narrowly on regional geopolit ical and economic concerns. Of  course, this tension
is f urther exacerbated at a t ime when the EU is going through a bout of  strong self -examination and
Germany is the key player in the def init ion of  a new European agenda.
The second option is to say that apart f rom the global/parochial dichotomy linking national/European
f oreign policy systems, one also has to contend with the other perennial point of  discussion which is the
divide between ‘Europeanist’ and ‘Atlanticist’ states. This, of  course, was a key distinction in the Cold War
era, but it has persisted throughout the post-1989 period (of ten resulting in blistering rows such as Iraq
2003), and becoming meaningf ul again in the context of  Common Security Def ence Policy (CSDP) and the
relationship between Europe and the US in terms of  military capabilit ies and interventions (as exemplif ied by
the Libya case).
Some states see their f oreign and security interests best served through an autonomous European
capability while others pref er the authority and f lexibility provided by a strong transatlantic component to
f oreign policy. What is at stake is not only Europe’s ability to act, but the rights of  states to choose with
whom they wish to act in concert in the pursuit of  rights and interests: sovereignty remains an issue but in
a very specif ic way.
Europe’s influence is waning
The relationship between national and European levels of  f oreign policy-making have always been
characterised as being blocked by the persistence of  state sovereign rights. Multiple ref orms in various
treaties have created elaborate policy mechanisms and procedures to overcome this basic tension – still, it
persists.
Indeed, some would argue that European f oreign policy is essentially a ‘procedure masquerading as a
policy’. But, in reality EU f oreign policy has been more than that, however much it may be stymied by
competing national interests and a cumbersome decision-making machinery. In terms of  trade and
development aid, the EU is a key international actor; enlargement has given it tremendous leverage in
regional terms, and morally if  not diplomatically many hold high expectations of  the EU internationally.
Militarily, or in terms of  its ability to inf luence its neighbourhood in North Af rica, the Middle East or the
Caucuses, let alone build meaningf ul ‘strategic partnerships’ with the BRICS (and other ‘emerging powers’),
the EU has been less successf ul.
What is clear is that in all these cases the current internal EU crisis is a debilitating f actor. While the EU
debates its f uture, and the core issue is yet again sovereignty, its f oreign policy inf luence wanes through a
combination of  uncertainty and neglect.
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